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Abstract 
Taken together the international move from liquidation to reorganization-based 
bankruptcy regimes and the international move to abolish Crown priority in 
bankruptcy provide Canada with an opportunity to rethink Crown priority in 
bankruptcy. This paper makes the case that abolishing Crown priority in 
bankruptcy in Canada is optimal given a revaluation of traditional normative 
claims surrounding Crown priority in the context of a bankruptcy system that 
favours reorganization when possible. While this paper focuses on Canada, it 
engages in a normative assessment that may be useful for possible reforms to 
Crown priority in the United States and in other jurisdictions that, like Canada, 
have been influenced, not only by the English model, but also by the American 
bankruptcy and reorganization system.  
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I. Introduction 
As the recent Canadian movie ‘‘The Corporation’’
[1]
documents, the corporation has 
to a large extent replaced the Crown
[2]
and religion as the institution that 
governs the lives of citizens worldwide. While historically Crown priority for 
payment of debts was rooted in the theory that the ‘‘King could do no 
wrong’’
[3]
this principle is being abandoned. However, in Canada the world of 
bankruptcy has been largely unaffected by this change. This is the case despite 
the fact that globally in the context of financially-troubled corporations, the 
demise of the privileged position accorded to the Crown has paralleled 
bankruptcy reform around the world that has been driven by institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund. Bankruptcy reform has seen an 
international move from liquidation-based bankruptcy regimes to regimes 
that encourage corporations to reorganize when possible.
[4]
Increasingly, 
governments are recognizing that formal reorganization provisions are 
necessary to deal with the number and diversity of creditors of an insolvent 
corporate debtor.
[5]
There is also a growing realization that in most economies, 
the value of a corporation comes from its human capital and goodwill, rather 
than its assets. Accordingly, in many instances the value of liquidating 
corporations has been reduced. 
Crown priority originally arose as part of the royal perogative. At common law, 
where there was a conflict between a Crown debt and another debt, the Crown’s 
debt was to be given preference, so long as both were of equal degree.
[6]
In 
many instances in Canadian bankruptcy history, the royal prerogative has 
been taken one step further by way of statutory provisions and judicial 
interpretations that favour Crown debt, even when it is not of equal degree to 
other competing debts. In reliance on the principle that because the royal 
perogative arose by way of common law it can be limited by legislation, 
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation governing Crown priorities has 
displaced the royal perogative in Canada. In this context, there is a long and 
detailed history of other creditors attempting to push the Crown to surrender its 
privileged position in bankruptcy or reorganization. 
Interestingly, while the royal perogative has English roots,
[7]
having been 
originally used by the Crown to assert a superior right to fish, wrecks, treasure 
trove, swans and precious metals,
[8]
England is the most recent jurisdiction to 
have abolished Crown priority in bankruptcy, with a view to encouraging 
corporations to reorganize when possible. This paper makes the case that 
abolishing Crown priority in bankruptcy and reorganization in Canada is 
optimal given a revaluation of traditional normative claims surrounding Crown 
priority in the context of a bankruptcy system that favours reorganization when 
possible. 
In describing the events leading up to the most recent period of bankruptcy 
reform in England, commentators have observed that there was a move away 
from professional dominance
[9]
and that discussions of reform resulted in ‘‘passionate 
exchanges among a wide array of creditors, debtors and policy-makers.’’
[10]
In 
making the case for the Canadian abolishment of Crown priority in bankruptcy, 
this paper aspires to contribute to moving the content of the Canadian debate 
in the field of bankruptcy and reorganization more generally, and Crown 
priority more specifically, in this direction. While this paper focuses on Canada, 
it engages in a normative assessment that may be useful for possible reforms to 
Crown priority in the United States and in other jurisdictions that, like 
Canada, have been influenced, not only by the English model, but also by the 
American bankruptcy and reorganization system. 
The international move from liquidation to reorganization-based regimes 
provides Canada with an opportunity to rethink Crown priority by weighing 
traditional normative claims along a new scale, where reorganization ranks high. 
Part II of this paper describes and situates the Canadian corporate 
reorganization system and Crown priority within the larger bankruptcy and 
insolvency system in Canada. Part III sets out and assesses the normative 
claims for granting the Crown priority in the context of a system that favours 
reorganization over liquidation. This paper concludes by arguing based on this 
normative assessment that Crown priority should be abolished in Canada and 
a system that encourages the Crown to adopt a more ‘‘commercial’’ approach to 
reorganization that commences prior to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings 
should be implemented. This proposal is put forward as a preferable alternative to 
the current Canadian reform proposals for continuing to limit director and 
officer liability for unpaid tax and at the same time creating Crown liens 




II. Crown Priority in Bankruptcy and Reorganization in Canada 
A. Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization system 
The Canadian bankruptcy and reorganization system operates on the consensus 
that when a corporation is liquidated, economic and social losses flow to all 
stakeholders including shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, 
customers, the Crown and other involuntary creditors. Accordingly, a major 
goal of Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization system is to encourage 
reorganization where the social and economic value of a reorganized corporation 
to all stakeholders, not just creditors, is more valuable than the liquidated 
corporation.
[12]
However, despite the national and international desire to 
facilitate reorganization, the Canadian Crown still retains priority status, 
ahead of secured lenders, for unremitted employee source deductions and for 
amounts for which a third party garnishment order has been issued prior to the 
commencement of a bankruptcy or reorganization of a corporate debtor. 
The current Canadian framework provides that an insolvent corporate debtor 
can either liquidate or reorganize under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
[13]
If a 
company has more than five million dollars in debt it can make use of either the 
BIA to liquidate or reorganize or the Companies Creditors’ Arrangements Act
[14]
to 
reorganize. Canadian courts have interpreted the CCAA as having a broad 
remedial purpose with a view to giving a debtor an opportunity to find a way out 
of financial difficulties short of bankruptcy, foreclosure or the seizure of assets 
through receivership proceedings.
[15]
By way of refinancing through debt, equity or 
the sale of business as a going concern, the BIA and the CCAA allow the debtor 
to attempt to reorganize in a way that will enable it to meet the demands of its 
creditors. 
Following three decades of limited use, in the mid-eighties, in response to the 
rigidity of the Canadian BIA and the requirement at the time that a debtor 
company must be bankrupt to reorganize, the CCAA re-emerged as a significant 
part of Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization framework. The Canadian 
judiciary and insolvency practitioners have used the inherent powers granted 
under the CCAA to the court to replicate many of the practices and powers 
found in the American Chapter 11,
[16]
however, without the same set of codified 
procedures and practices found in Chapter 11.
[17]
 
In contrast to the more specific provisions found in the BIA, the CCAA is a short 
statute, with few guidelines, that provides a flexible framework and the court with 
a high degree of discretion. Because reorganizations under the BIA tend to be less 
expensive but more rigid in nature, a reorganization under the BIA is better suited 
for a small, less complicated proceeding. The CCAA, on the other hand, provides 
more flexibility, a more comprehensive stay of proceedings, and accordingly is 
better suited to complex, larger reorganizations, that cannot easily fit into the 
more restrictive provisions found in the BIA. 
Under both pieces of legislation, the debtor company continues to run its business 
for the purpose of restructuring and a stay of creditors’ collection actions against 
the reorganizing debtor is provided for. In the case of the BIA, a trustee, who is 
usually an accountant, is chosen by the debtor and approved by the court to oversee 
the process and at the same time provide guidance to the corporate debtor. In a 
CCAA reorganization, a monitor, who is also often an accountant, and can be the 
debtor’s former auditor, is appointed to fulfil a similar function. Both the trustee 
and the monitor are court officers. 
The trustee in a BIA and the monitor in a CCAA work with the corporate debtor 
to file a proposal or plan of reorganization with the corporations’ creditors that 
typically provides for paying off only a portion of the corporation’s debts and/or 
paying the debts over a longer period of time. Both the trustee and monitor 
must report to the court and the creditors on the financial affairs of the 
company, the cause of financial difficulties and also provide creditors with a 
comparison of how they would fare in a liquidation versus a proposal. The 
trustee has a much more detailed set of statutory obligations and licensing 
requirements than the monitor. The creditors and the court must approve the 
proposal or plan of reorganization. 
When a corporation attempts to reorganize, the Crown will typically be one of 
its major creditors. In many cases, the Crown will have claims for employee source 
deductions and goods and services tax (a value-added tax known as ‘‘GST’’). The 
tension that persists between the rights of creditors, particularly secured creditors, 
and the rights of the Crown when a corporation is insolvent are magnified when a 
corporation is attempting to reorganize rather than liquidate. In order to 
successfully reorganize, the corporation needs to be able to address the 
repayment or rescheduling of these liabilities. At the same time, in order to 
address these issues, the corporation needs to have ‘‘breathing space,’’ a respite 
from collection activities of its creditors. 
The battle over Crown priority in the Canadian bankruptcy context has been 
fought in the context of expensive and lengthy litigation over technical 
interpretations of the legislative provisions, without a clear articulation of the 
competing policies at issue. Currently, a major review of Canada’s bankruptcy and 
restructuring regime is under way.
[18]
In November 2003, the Standing Senate 
Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce released its report after months 
of consultation with various stakeholders.
[19]
The Senate Report expressed the 
view that the costs of restructuring should be minimized to the extent that it is 
reasonably possible and so as to provide insolvent companies with the incentive 
to reorganize rather than become bankrupt where it is in the best interests of the 
stakeholders.
[20]
Further, the Senate Report expressed the view that tax policy 
and legislation should not move the debtor company to choose between 
restructuring and liquidation.
[21]
However, the Senate Report did not recommend 
the abolishment of Crown priority in bankruptcy or reorganization.  
In contrast to the United States, which has statutory priority schemes in its 
bankruptcy legislation to deal with Crown claims for unpaid tax in a debtor’s 
bankruptcy or reorganization,
[22]
or England, which historically relied on 
preferred creditor status for unpaid taxes,
[23]
Canada currently relies on the deemed 
trust and the Crown’s garnishment powers as the two primary mechanisms for 
granting the Crown priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Generally, amounts due 
and owing to the Crown are unsecured claims in a bankruptcy or 
reorganization. However, the deemed trust and garnishment powers operate to 
give the Crown an increased ability to collect its liabilities. 
The priority status of creditors under a BIA liquidation can be divided into three 
categories. First in priority are trust claimants, who are not creditors in the sense 
that they have claim to property that the debtor holds in trust for them. Second in 
priority are secured creditors who hold a valid lien, charge or security interest on 
the property of the debtor.
[24]
Third, are unsecured creditors that can be divided 
into two categories, preferred creditors and ordinary unsecured creditors. Preferred 
creditors are given priority over other unsecured creditors and include landlords 
and employees up to a maximum amount.
[25]
The remaining creditors are ordinary 
unsecured creditors, including those with judgments, and share equally in what is 
left of the distribution after all other claims have been satisfied. 
Prior to 1992, Crown claims ranked above all other unsecured claims, as a 
preferred creditor, even if the Crown claim was of equal degree. The 1992 
amendments limited this priority and did away with the Crown’s status as a 
preferred creditor.
[26]
In an effort to circumvent this low ranking priority, 
amendments were made to non-bankruptcy federal and provincial legislation 
that created statutory liens for unpaid amounts owing to the Crown, a deemed 
trust for amounts withheld by a debtor on behalf of the Crown but not 
remitted, and provided the Crown with a power to garnish accounts receivable 
owing to the debtor.
[27]
Both technical and constitutional battles were fought on 
each of these provisions. The Supreme Court of Canada held that attempts in 
provincial legislation to circumvent the bankruptcy legislation were 
unconstitutional because the provincial legislation conflicted with federal 
legislation.
[28]
Such provincial legislation is effective against other creditors 
outside of bankruptcy proceedings, however, on the commencement of a 
liquidation or reorganization, the bankruptcy legislation prevails. 
Current law provides that in a bankruptcy or reorganization, the Crown’s claim 
ranks as an unsecured claim unless the Crown has registered a security interest 
under applicable provincial laws. Even if the Crown has registered such a security 
interest, it is subordinate to competing security interests in the collateral that were 
perfected before the Crown’s registration and the Crown’s security interest is valid 
only in respect of amounts owing at the time of registration and any interest that 
accrues subsequently.
[29]
However, the deemed trust status of source deductions 
pursuant to federal tax, pension and unemployment insurance and their 
provincial equivalents for money withheld but not remitted to the government, 
persists in bankruptcy and reorganization.
[30]
Further, a garnishment letter 
sent out prior to the commencement of bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings 
retains a priority status.
[31]
 
B. Deemed trust 
The deemed trust provisions found in the Canadian Income Tax Act
[32]
are 
recognized in liquidation and reorganization only for amounts withheld from 
employees for federal and provincial equivalents for income taxes, unemployment 
insurance and employee contributions to the Canada Pension Plan.
[33]
On the 
deemed trust theory, withholding taxes are granted priority over secured as well as 
unsecured claims in liquidation, except for pre-existing liens on real property. 
It has been estimated that approximately 87% of personal taxes in Canada are 
collected by way of employers withholding remuneration paid to employees on 
account of the employee’s tax for the year and remitting these amounts to the 
government in prescribed intervals.
[34]
The Crown estimates that employee 
withholdings generate ‘‘most of the funds required for the federal 
government’s own operations, but also the amounts redistributed through 
various social programs.’’
[35]
The current status of the deemed trust for unremitted 
source deductions can be traced to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
[36]
in 
Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp.,
[37]
the 1998 amendments to the ITA and 




In Sparrow, both the Royal Bank of Canada and the Crown claimed an interest in 
the proceeds of the bankrupt corporation. The Royal Bank had a security interest 
in the inventory of the corporate debtor that was characterized as a fixed and specific 
charge over the inventory. The Crown claimed a deemed trust with respect to the 
debtor’s unremitted source deductions. The Court held that since the inventory was 
subject to the Royal Bank’s security interest before the unremitted source deductions 
gave rise to a deemed trust in favour of the Crown, the Royal Bank’s security interest 
attached to the debtor’s inventory in priority to the Crown’s interest under the 
deemed trust. However, in reaching this conclusion the Court noted that the 
government was free to amend the ITA to strengthen the deemed trust provisions. 
Accordingly, in 1998, retroactively to 1994, the ITA was amended to provide that 
the deemed trust provisions are applicable from ‘‘the time the amount was 
deducted or withheld,’’
[39]
‘‘notwithstanding any security interest in the amount so 
deducted or withheld’’
[40]
and include ‘‘property held by any secured creditor . . . that 
but for a security interest would be property of the person.’’
[41]
Most recently, 
in First Vancouver, the Supreme Court clarified that the deemed trust for 
unremitted source deductions applies to after-acquired property, and while the 
deemed trust does not continue to attach  to property sold  by the debtor the 
proceeds of the sale are ‘‘captured by the trust.’’ 
Deemed trust claims may be stayed under both the BIA and the CCAA. However, 
while the stay is in effect, the debtor company must maintain the payments to 
the Crown and if the debtor defaults in so doing, the stay order ceases to be in 
effect.
[42]
Within six months of a CCAA plan or a BIA proposal being 
sanctioned by the court, the deemed trust claims must be paid, unless the Crown 
consents to an alternative payment schedule.
[43]
 
C. Garnishment powers 
A statutory garnishment or an ‘‘enhanced requirement to pay’’ to recover GST or 
income tax issued before the date of bankruptcy, the filing of a proposal or an 
intention to file a proposal under the BIA or the initial order in a CCAA create a 
property right for the Crown and the receivables to which the garnishment 
letter attaches are no longer part of the bankrupt’s estate.
[44]
This power has 
given rise to a small amount of litigation, but has not presented the range of 
technical or constitutional challenges that have arisen in relation to the 
deemed trust. However, this power can in certain instances enable the Crown to 
force a debtor into liquidation, prior to providing the debtor with an opportunity 
to attempt to reorganize. The Crown can proceed in this manner without 
providing the notice that a secured creditor, who holds similar powers, is 
required to provide prior to enforcing its security. This issue is exacerbated to 
the extent that Crown priority is eliminated in reorganization or bankruptcy and a 
clear and consistent set of guidelines is not followed or articulated by the Crown 




III. An Assessment of Normative Claims 
Relating to Crown Priority 
This section outlines and evaluates the recurrent normative claims that have been 
made for and against Crown priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Each category of 
claim is specifically considered in the context of the move from liquidation-based 
bankruptcy regimes to regimes that encourage reorganization. Assessing 
traditional normative claims surrounding Crown priority in the context of a 
reorganization, rather than a liquidation, provides a good opportunity to 
understand Crown priority within a whole system, with wider ranging 
consequences than those impacting the distribution of the limited funds 
available when a corporation is liquidated. That is, the context is broadened to 
one that considers the implications of Crown priority on multiple converging 
and diverging interests, where certain decisions with respect to values and 
objectives have already been made with a move towards a reorganization 
based rather than a liquidation-based corporate bankruptcy system. 
As with reorganization rhetoric standing alone, none of the normative claims 
alone suggest retaining or abolishing Crown priority in Canada, however, taken 
together a powerful claim for abolishing Crown priority in Canada may be 
made. The revaluation of traditional normative claims in this part of the paper 
illustrate that if Crown priority is abolished the Crown will lose a source of direct 
revenue, but this loss will be matched by private sector gains, which will indirectly 
help the Crown.
[46]
 That is, the net loss to the Crown resulting from the 
abolishment of Crown priority is less than the value that will be created for a wide 
range of stakeholders by allowing firms to reorganize. For firms that are 
ultimately liquidated, the net loss to the Crown from the abolishment of Crown 
priority is less than the value that will flow to unsecured creditors in not 
incurring further claims that they will have limited ability to collect on. 
A. Involuntary creditor 
Creditors can be divided into those that voluntarily contract with the debtor and 
involuntary creditors who are placed in a debtor/creditor relationship unwillingly. 
The Crown, as an involuntary creditor, cannot screen potential debtors prior to 
extending credit, and is compelled to take all debtors, regardless of the level of 
their credit.
[47]
Another type of involuntary creditor is the tort claimant.
[48]
Within 
the category of contractual creditors, certain creditors because of an inequality of 
bargaining power with the debtor may look more like involuntary creditors than 
voluntary creditors. Such creditors include unpaid suppliers of the debtor.
[49]
Unlike 
other creditors, involuntary creditors and weaker voluntary creditors may not 
have the ability to diversify their credit and/or negotiate for terms that take into 
account their debtor/creditor relationship.
[50]
 
Depending on the amount of power or influence it is believed that the Crown 
currently holds in Canadian society, one might think that the Crown is a rather 
unlikely member of this group of relatively powerless creditors. At the same time, 
the Crown does share the attribute of being an involuntary creditor.
[51]
The 
Canadian response in the liquidation context historically was to insert certain 
safeguards in the bankruptcy system for involuntary creditors and voluntary weak 
creditors. However, recently this response has been met with hostility from the 
insolvency practitioner community with claims stemming primarily from the 
impact of such priority on the possibility for reorganizing.
[52]
 
Accordingly, the Crown’s claim to priority status as an involuntary creditor may 
be refuted on the basis of recent bankruptcy and reorganization reform efforts 
in Canada that have rejected granting involuntary and voluntary weak 
creditors a special priority on the basis of the involuntary nature of their claims 
where the successful reorganization of corporations is at stake. For example, as 
between small suppliers and the Crown, small suppliers are harder hit by 
default of the debtor and are less able to prepare for the risk, yet Canada has 
moved in the direction of eliminating any priority status for such suppliers. 
Further, unlike other involuntary creditors, the Crown is in a position to adjust tax 
levels to account for the possibility of default.
[53]
In addition, unlike other 
involuntary and voluntary weak creditors, but similar to an investor 
contemplating an investment portfolio, the Crown has a completely diversified 
portfolio of debtors, which many consider to be a rational method of 
maximizing the value of one’s investments.
[54]
This advantage may be sufficient 
to compensate for the Crown’s inability to adjust individual risk premiums 
when the risk of default of one of its debtor’s increases.
[55]
 
B. Other collection options and the integrity of the taxation system 
A key reason for the Crown’s uneasy fit in a group of involuntary or voluntary 
weak creditors is the fact that that the Crown is supported by a strong legislative 
taxation scheme and has an arsenal of other collection devices, not shared by all 
other creditors, available to it prior to the insolvency of the debtor corporation. 
These include the imposition of penalties, high interest rates and third party 
liability. Further, it is open to the Crown to improve its status by registering a 
security interest against the corporate debtor. An argument can also be made 
that the Crown may impose certain additional requirements on corporate 
debtors, such as requiring that source deductions or unremitted GST be kept 
in a separate trust account or that a security bond be posted. 
In a system that grants Crown priority for unpaid taxes in bankruptcy, 
delinquent collection efforts may be rewarded. This is the case despite the 
fact that requirements, such as those imposed on directors, ensure that the Crown 
has regular reports on the corporation’s tax payments, which may be more 
information than is provided to many of the corporation’s other creditors. 
Further, in many instances other unsecured and involuntary creditors will have 
no way of knowing if the corporation has been delinquent in its collection efforts. 
These are the same creditors who will carry the largest part of the burden if the 
Crown is granted priority in liquidation. 
The Crown’s most convincing response to the claim that it has a whole host of 
other collection options available to it and that the current process rewards its 
shirking of responsibility, is that what is ultimately at stake in assessing the 
Crown’s claim for priority in bankruptcy is the integrity of the taxation system. The 
rhetoric that supports Crown priority as a method of ensuring integrity of Canada’s 
taxation system reflects the American position and was adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Pigott Project Management Ltd. v. Land-Rock Resources 
Ltd,
[56]
holding that ‘‘no other system is so crucial to the overall collections 
procedure adopted by the Crown . . . understandably, that conversion cannot be 
countenanced if the integrity of that system is not preserved.’’
[57]
 
It has been suggested that the American position on Crown priority can be 
distinguished from the British pattern on the basis of a persistent rhetoric 
surrounding the integrity of the taxation system. That is, because taxation in 
modern society relies on the integrity of the taxation system, if Crown 
priority was limited or removed in the bankruptcy context, tax compliance 
would cease to exist.
[58]
A similar normative claim has been made in the Canadian 
context, however, it is not supported by the actual functioning of Canada’s 
taxation system as it relates to financially troubled corporations. This is 
demonstrated by an examination of the Crown’s policy on Crown priorities. 
The Canadian Crown is of the view that ‘‘since the Crown’s priority results 
from legislation that is binding on third parties, the CCRA [Crown] is not obliged 
to monitor the person’s business, to issue forms or claims, or to register or 
publish notice of its priority rights’’
[59]
Further, ‘‘a creditor who is trying to decide 
whether to seize and sell a person’s property in which the creditor has a secured 
interest, or thinking about appointing a receiver to recover the debt, cannot get 
any information about any amounts that the person may owe under a deemed 
trust unless the person gives the CCRA written authorization to disclose such 
information. However, once the creditor begins official proceedings to recover 
the secured amount, the CCRA can communicate the details of any deemed 
trust claim that it may have.’’
[60]
This policy clearly does not comport with the 
Crown’s claim that what is at stake in maintaining Crown priority is the integrity 
of Canada’s taxation system. 
When the goal of reorganization is inserted in the discussion surrounding the 
integrity of the taxation system, a persuasive argument may be made that a 
taxation system that does not exhibit all signs of integrity assists a financially-
troubled corporation in reorganizing by providing the corporation with time and 
money in the form of unpaid taxes. However, when the entire reorganization 
process is viewed as a whole this may not be the case. The higher the Crown’s 
priority in a reorganization, the less likely that other stakeholders, such as 
unsecured creditors and certain secured creditors, will take an interest in the 




The normative claim in favour of maintaining the integrity of the tax system 
favours abolishing Crown priority when viewed in the context of the interests and 
roles played by all stakeholders in reorganization. However, the Crown’s current 
collection policies suggest the need for reform efforts to ensure that the goals of 
preserving the integrity of the taxation system while also encouraging 
reorganization are met in the pre-bankruptcy or reorganization context. 
C. Protection of the public purse (or the general public) 
Related to the rhetoric in favour of maintaining the integrity of the taxation system, 
the rhetoric in favour of allowing corporations to reorganize rather than liquidate 
is often centred on the public interest in retaining jobs, stability and community 
among other goals. However, in the context of Crown priority this claim is 
challenged by the view that it may be that the benefits to the smaller number of 
corporate stakeholders in allowing the corporation to reorganize are diminished 
by the impact of unpaid Crown debts on the public more generally. To that extent, 
the policy arguments centre on notions of property ownership and unjust 
enrichment. That is, the tax arrears are amounts that never belonged to the 
debtor and should not be used to reorganize the debtor or provide a windfall to 
the corporate debtor’s other creditors. 
Standing against this claim is the fact that corporate debtors cannot readjust 
the amount of credit owing to the Crown and transfer the risk of non-payment to 
the Crown because it is a ‘‘cheaper’’ creditor. The amount of tax owing is a legal 
requirement that cannot be adjusted beyond a maximum amount at the debtor’s 
discretion.
[62]
At the same time, in most instances, if the corporation is not able to 
reorganize, the public purse will be harmed by the very limited recovery on 
Crown debts.
[63]
There is also the danger that if the Crown is granted too much 
priority with a view to protecting the public purse, Canada’s bankruptcy and 
restructuring regime will not be the collective governance mechanism that it was 
intended to be, but rather a tax collection device.
[64]
Further, the loss to the public 
purse may be proportionally minimal compared to the loss to other creditors and 
to the extent that other creditors are able to continue as taxpayers after the debtor 
corporation’s reorganization, the Crown can continue to collect tax from them. 
It may be that in order to achieve the objective of reorganizing insolvent 
corporations, the losses should be born by the general public, not just those who 
were in a debtor/creditor relationship with the debtor.
[65]
 
Even within the Crown, more than simply tax authorities are implicated in the 
insolvency of a corporation.
[66]
A successful reorganization, may not only limit the 
extent of loss to the Crown for unpaid corporate taxes, but also the losses to other 
federal, provincial, and local governments with diverse economic interests in a 
corporation’s reorganization. Ultimately, the quality of neighbourhoods, 
communities, the environment and retirement may be at stake in decisions as to 
whether to protect the public purse by abolishing or granting Crown priority.
[67]
  
Interestingly, the Senate has recently endorsed a view that would interfere with 
the public purse at the urging of the insolvency practitioner community on the 
basis of technical amendments to Crown priority. Currently, insolvent corporate 
debtors can convert debt into distressed preferred shares, which are accorded special 
treatment under the ITA, but that are costly to create. The benefit of such preferred 
shares is that they provide a low cost means of financing a restructuring at the 
expense of the public purse. The Senate recommended amendments to the ITA that 
would dispense with the current procedures and provide that distress preferred 
share treatment for tax purposes be afforded to qualifying debt, for a specified 
period of time, by filing a notice of election.
[68]
Further, Senate dealt with the current 
difference in tax treatment as between a debtor that reorganizes and a debtor 
that sells the business as a going concern.
[69]
The Senate recommended that as is 
the case in a liquidation and purchase, a debtor should be able to elect to use 
fresh start accounting for tax purposes in a reorganization, with tax obligations 
relating to the period prior to the date of bankruptcy addressed as pre-filing 
claims.
[70]
There does not appear to be a principled reason for a ‘‘back-door’’ 
approach to encroaching on the public purse, where the rhetoric that the Crown 
asserts in favour of retaining Crown priority rests on an interest in preserving the 
public purse. 
D. Bankruptcy as a collective process 
Similar to the policy in favour of including secured creditors in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, if the Crown is able to ‘‘pull the plug’’ in the same way that a secured 
creditor is able to realize on the oven of a reorganizing pizza parlour, a 
reorganization will be thwarted.
[71]
As discussed in Part II, unlike secured 
creditors who are required to provide notice to the debtor prior to enforcing 
on their security, the Crown is not required to provide the debtor with notice 
prior to issuing a garnishment order. Accordingly, if Crown priority is abolished, 
garnishment orders may be issued with increased speed and frequency and a 
debtor may not have as long of a period to extend its operations in insolvency by 
making use of funds owing to the Crown. 
It does not automatically flow from the implications of Crown collection 
mechanisms on the collective bankruptcy process that the Crown should continue 
to hold a priority status. Following the English approach, this claim supports the 
establishment of a better working relationship between the Crown, other 
creditors and debtors with the goal of full contribution to a system that favours 
reorganization. Such an approach necessitates an understanding that not all 
corporations should be reorganized. 
Up until September 2003, the Crown in England had been criticized for insisting 
on 100% payment in order to approve proposals under the corporate voluntary 
arrangement (‘‘CVA’’)
[72]
and for taking significant periods of time to approve 
proposals. These problems were in part due to the lack of integration among 
departments and staffing problems, thereby frustrating proposals that 
unsecured creditors would otherwise agree to.
[73]
It was recommended in the 
course of the 1999 consultations held by the Insolvency Service that the Crown 
develop a more commercial approach to CVAs so that proposals that were 
less than 100% would be accepted if it was held that the CVA would offer a 
superior return in the long run.
[74]
 
On the basis of these views, the taxing authorities in England established a 
Voluntary Arrangements Service, which had the mandate of working ‘‘to help its 
customers, to work collaboratively with the private sector and other government 
departments and to make a full contribution to business rescue by supporting viable 
businesses through periods of temporary difficulty.’’
[75]
The Voluntary 




Even without the development of a Canadian equivalent to the British Voluntary 
Arrangements Service, the abolishment of Crown priority will provide the Crown 
with the incentive to support reorganizations given its low priority should the 
corporation ultimately liquidate. Further, to the extent that the current system 
provides debtors with a longer period of time to recover, as the Crown is less 
likely to the monitor its payment of taxes, the abolishment of Crown priority 
would place a corresponding incentive on secured creditors to monitor, albeit with 
less information. Ultimately, even if the result in such a system is that the Crown 
or secured creditors in certain instances will attempt to liquidate debtors more 
quickly, there may be a corresponding benefit to other stakeholders, such as 
unsecured suppliers, when the debtor is not be able to increase an unsecured 
debt that it will not be able to pay. 
Canada has not adopted a blanket policy in favour of reorganization, but rather a 
policy in favour of reorganization when it is in the best interests of all stakeholders, 
including the Crown. Professor Sarra adopts this perspective in asserting, ‘‘when 
the firm is economically inefficient and change in governance practice will 
not remedy it’s financial distress, the best outcome may be to liquidate and 
release the capital to higher value uses.’’
[77]
 
E. Effect on availability of credit 
Secured lenders and the lawyers that represent them have repeatedly suggested that 
they will cease to lend funds to corporations or will do so only at a higher rate of 
interest unless the extent of the Crown’s priority is clarified. For example, as one 
prominent Canadian lawyer, asserts: ‘‘Rather than increase its monitoring to ensure 
that source deductions are paid on a timely basis, Revenue Canada has shifted the 
burden of its monitoring to secured lenders, who may or may not have the ability 
to monitor the borrower’s compliance with its duties to remit source deductions. 
This approach places additional risk on lenders, and will undoubtedly be factored 
into lenders’ advance rates, and lenders’ costs of doing business in Canada.’’
[78]
 
The claim made by lenders is that despite expensive and lengthy litigation that 
has focused on the technical bounds of the provisions relating to Crown priority in 
a bankruptcy or reorganization, there is still a significant lack of clarity, and the 
goal of enhancing commercial accessibility to credit by minimizing uncertainty in 
the resolution of policy disputes has not been realized.
[79]
Rather, a ‘‘seize 
mentality’’ persists, as does a ‘‘technical war’’ among creditors. On this basis, 
lenders need to closely monitor debtors, which in turn pushes up the cost of 
credit and results in higher interest rates. This impact has been born more by 
corporations that are labour intensive, versus capital intensive, and have a 
significant number of employees and accordingly are subject to the deemed trust for 
unpaid source deductions. 
Working against this claim is the lack of empirical data retained by the Crown on 
exactly how much they collect by way of the existing mechanisms in a bankruptcy 
or reorganization
[80]
and the lack of data supporting the fact that with each court 
challenge credit becomes less and less accessible. Further, market conditions also 
dictate the supply of credit and may mitigate against higher lending costs associated 
with Crown priority status. 
Given the pervasive nature of a security interest taken by an operating lender, 
and the fact that in most cases if Crown priority is abolished the benefit would 
flow to secured creditors,
[81]
a more powerful claim may be made in favour of 
abolishing Crown priority on account of the corporate debtor’s creditors on the 
basis that the Crown is also a creditor of these creditors. Accordingly, the secured 
creditors’ gain out of the abolishment of Crown priority and the possibility of a 
reorganized entity may offset the Crown’s losses in the form of increased taxes. 
This claim is most evident in a consideration of the difference between 
operating lenders who are secured by inventory and accounts receivable of the 
debtor and are better able to protect against the risk of Crown priority in their 
lending practices, and term lenders who are secured by fixed assets and are not in 
a position to protect against such risk. Roderick Wood and Rick Reeson provide 
an excellent illustration of the problem with the existing law that grants the 
Crown priority over term lenders: ‘‘A seller (SP) sells a piece of heavy equipment 
to a construction company under a secured instalment purchase agreement. 
There is $100,000 left unpaid on the purchase price and credit charges. The 
construction company later experiences financial difficulties and fails to remit 
source deductions. It also fails to make any further instalment payments to 
SP.’’
[82]
Pursuant to the ITA,
[83]
the Crown has priority over SP to the heavy equipment 
despite the fact that SP has not benefited from the construction company’s failure to 
remit source deductions. 
 
F. Creditor’s bargain 
In The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law,
[84]
 Thomas Jackson makes the case 
that based on the creditor’s bargain, entitlements in bankruptcy should not 
differ from those outside of bankruptcy. A system that does not follow this premise 
will provide an incentive for creditors to push a debtor into bankruptcy in order 
to obtain the advantages available in bankruptcy and not outside of bankruptcy. 
Accordingly, a claim may be made that Canada’s bankruptcy and reorganization 
system should not provide for separate Crown priority, but should instead 
maintain the priority status held by creditors of a solvent corporation. This is 
the position that was adopted in the German Bankruptcy Code of 1994 
(Insolvenzordnung),
[85]
which was implemented in 1999. 
A proposal resembling Jackson’s model was put forward in evidence given to the 
Senate this past year.
[86]
The proposal provided for the creation of a new statutory 
regime that provides a uniform system for governing Crown priority both inside and 
outside of a bankruptcy or reorganization.
[87]
The uniform system would provide for a 
requirement that the Crown registers a security interest in order to retain a priority 
status in a bankruptcy or reorganization, with an exception to the first-in-time rule 
for security interests on amounts currently covered by federal deemed trusts. 
Among other critiques that this proposal, like Jackson’s model, may be subject 
to, is that it is based on the premise that an insolvent corporation consists of 
nothing more than a pool of assets, without a residual potential. This is 
contrary to both the Canadian and  the international move to bankruptcy systems 
that value ongoing business relationships and recognize the hardships that fall 
not just on creditors, but also on other stakeholders when a corporation is 
liquidated. In order to achieve this objective, where there is an entitlement 
outside of bankruptcy, in many instances it will be necessary to revalue this 
entitlement in bankruptcy or reorganization with a new priority scheme that 
reflects a society’s valuation of reorganized entities over liquidated entities. 
Where the Crown retains the same priority status inside and outside of 
liquidation, it will have little interest in continuing with a reorganization. To the 
extent that the Crown has no priority status in a bankruptcy its concern with 
receiving a share of the entity may contribute to the Crown’s desire to assist in the 
reorganization of the debtor and to prevent the piecemeal sale of the 
corporation’s assets. Further, a review of Canadian legislative history in this area 
suggests that the adoption of Crown liens priority legislation would give rise to 
another wave of technical amendments and litigation, and would not contribute 
to the goal of reorganization of insolvent corporations when possible. 
G. Director and officer liability 
Intimately connected with normative claims pertaining to Crown priority are the 
normative claims relating to director and officer liability for unpaid taxes. At 
the same time as abolishing Crown priority in Canada, it may be necessary to 
reconsider a move towards limiting director and officer liability for unpaid 
taxes. Such an approach is consistent with the overall Canadian and 
international move towards holding corporate gatekeepers more accountable in 
light of recent corporate scandals.
[88]
However, this approach was not adopted in 
the Senate’s recommendations on Crown priority or director and officer 
liability. 
Currently when a corporate debtor becomes insolvent or is in the vicinity of 
insolvency, the corporation’s directors are exposed to personal liability for unpaid 
debts including Crown debts. However, based on the fact that insurance for director 
and officer liability that covers liability to the Crown is increasingly difficult 
and costly to obtain during the reorganization period, and the desire to 
recruit and retain good directors and officers, amendments were made to 
the BIA and the CCAA in 1997. In both a CCAA reorganization and BIA 
proposal, the ability of the Crown to collect unpaid taxes from directors and 
officers is weakened by the range of defences available to directors under tax 
legislation and the possibility of compromising claims as part of the 
reorganization. The 1997 amendments now make it possible for a CCAA plan or 
a BIA proposal to provide for the compromise of claims against directors where 
they are legally liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such 
claims.
[89]
Further, to facilitate such a compromise, the stay may extend to them 




Most recently, the Senate Report, with aview to increasing the number of 
competent directors willing to continue with insolvent corporations, 
recommended augmenting the compromise mechanism in the BIA by 
providing for a generally applicable due diligence defence against personal 
liability for unpaid taxes for corporate directors.
[91]
Interestingly, the Senate Report 
did not make a similar recommendation for the CCAA. In order to satisfy the 
due diligence defence that is available under most existing tax legislation, 
directors must demonstrate active involvement in ensuring compliance. This 
may include evidence that controls were established to account for withholdings 
of employees and remittances, requiring financial officers of the corporation to 
report regularly on the implementation of these controls, and obtaining 
regular confirmation that withholdings and remittances have in fact been made 
during all relevant periods.
[92]
It is unclear whether an amendment to the BIA to 
provide for a generally applicable due diligence defence would require the same 
evidence as is required under existing tax legislation. 
Justifications in favour of imposing personal liability to third parties on directors 
and officers of corporations are premised on their roles as gatekeepers and 
monitors as well as the desire not to externalize the costs of operating a 
corporation. These arguments are said to be strongest in the context of 
involuntary creditors, such as the Crown.
[93]
Further, the justifications for limiting 
personal liability with the goal of providing directors and officers with the 
opportunity and incentive to engage in justifiably risky behaviour on behalf of 
the corporation is limited in the taxation context.
[94]
As a corporation 
approaches insolvency, this risky behaviour may include putting off 
payment of taxes. The Crown has made the claim that if Crown priority is 
abolished this will lead them to issue garnishment notices at a higher speed and 
in larger numbers, with the ultimate result of forcing corporations into bankruptcy 
at an earlier stage.
[95]
However, if Crown priority is abolished and a mechanism is 
put into place to ensure the cooperation of the Crown prior to bankruptcy, the need 
for an incentive to entice directors and officers to engage in such risky 
behaviour in order to achieve the goal of reorganization of a corporation will not 
exist. Accordingly, the need to further limit director and officer liability beyond 
the existing defences found in tax legislation may not be necessary if Crown priority 
is abolished. 
IV. Conclusion 
Internationally and in Canada, multiple and competing approaches to corporate 
insolvency have been converging around the goal of preserving viable corporate 
enterprises. While Canada is a beneficiary in part of British insolvency laws, over 
time there have been adjustments and diversions from the British approach, 
influenced by both local conditions and international developments. The 
history of Crown priority in Canada’s bankruptcy system is one of undue 
complication that has taken away from the goal of an effective reorganization 
process. The evaluation of the normative claims in Part III builds a convincing 
case for reverting to our British roots by following their lead and dispensing 
with Crown priority. However, in order to effectively implement this process, it 
will be necessary for the Crown to commit to a ‘‘commercial approach’’ to 
reorganization even before a corporation has entered formal bankruptcy 
proceedings. A model for this approach is the English Voluntary Arrangements 




To summarize, the proposals put forward in this paper call for the abolishment of 
Crown priority, the adoption of a commercial and cooperative approach to 
collection of debts by the Crown and a reconsideration of the move to limit 
director and officer liability for unpaid taxes. These proposals are consistent 
with the growing international recognition that insolvency systems do not serve 
simply to raise the efficiency level of local and international economies. 
Rather, such systems are necessary to affect a balance among social, 
economic and political interests.
[97]
 These factors favour not only formal 
reorganization mechanisms, but also the abolishment of Crown priority in 
bankruptcy. 
This paper has not provided a systematic explanation of why given a normative 
assessment that favours abolishment of Crown priority in bankruptcy Crown 
priority persists in Canada. Professional dominance of groups involved in reform 
efforts who have fees at stake in future work emanating out of technical 
amendments to Crown priority and the prevailing ideology of a small, 
homogenous group of lawyers and accountants who represent creditors and 
debtor corporations in Canada are likely part of the answer to this important 
question. The quest for the answer to this question should be part of the ongoing 
research agenda on issues of bankruptcy and reorganization reform in Canada.  
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